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A psychological bias helps to explain why voters focus on the
election-year economy
Voters have long displayed the perplexing inclination to reelect presidential candidates based on
the performance of the economy during election years—a tendency that can turn elections into a
game of chance based on the arc of the business cycle, rather than a careful review of the
candidates’ performances. Andrew Healy and Gabriel Lenz examine this trend, concluding that
voters actually prefer to evaluate candidates based on their entire terms. However, without the
necessary information at their fingertips, voters simplify and use conditions at the end to represent
the whole term.
In the US, we—the voters—elect our presidents using a potentially problematic decision rule: we
largely decide who will be president based on the election-year economy. What happens in earlier
years of a president’s term mostly doesn’t matter. Figure 1 shows the unimportance of the
economy in years 1-3 of a president’s term―often years 5-7 of his overall tenure―for
determining the election outcome. In contrast, Figure 2 shows the strong relationship between the
election-year economy and the incumbent party’s success at the ballot box. In boom years such
as 1964 and 1984, the incumbent party wins in a landslide. In recession years, such as 1980 and
2008, the incumbent party is crushed.
Figure 1: Vote margin and the economy in years 1-3
Figure 2: Vote margin and the election year economy
Why is this decision rule problematic? Because it means we pick our president in large part by the toss of a coin.
Economists have long known that whether the economy is on the upswing or downswing in any given year—that
is, where the economy is in the business cycle—is mostly chance. As a result, this decision rule essentially turns
the election of the world’s most powerful leader into a game much like, as Chris Achen and Larry Bartels put it,
musical chairs: when the music stops on Election Day, voters decide based on where the economy happens to be
in the business cycle.
To understand the ramifications, consider the following thought experiment: What if, instead of hitting in 2008, the
financial crisis had hit in 2009, after the presidential election? The subprime bubble had been growing since at
least 2002, and there’s no reason the music had to stop in 2008. If it had stopped a year later, we may well have
elected John McCain rather than Barack Obama. You can conduct a similar thought experiment for many
elections. The American economy experienced a short but severe recession in 1980. If the recession had come a
year earlier or a year later, Ronald Reagan may never have become president. If the more severe 1981-82
recession had occurred two years later, Walter Mondale would likely have defeated Reagan in 1984 rather than
losing in a landslide.
Following these counterfactuals, we investigate why voters obey this rule. The results are intriguing. Our first key
finding, based on a combination of national surveys and experiments, is that voters apparently don’t know they are
using this decision rule. When we asked voters how they evaluated the president’s economic performance, to our
surprise, they said they focus roughly equally on all four years of a president’s term, only intending to put a little
more weight on more recent performance. Put differently, voters care about total growth under the president, not
just election-year growth.
If voters intend to focus on total growth under the president, why do they actually judge the president on election-
year growth and what can we do about it? Using a series of experiments, we investigate these questions by
showing participants graphs, such as the two shown below, of economic conditions in each year of a president’s
term (they did not know which president). After looking at the graphs, we asked them to evaluate the economy
under the president.
Figure 3: Economy 1
Figure 4: Economy 2
We found that participants consistently rated the second economy much more highly than the first, even though
the first economy has higher total growth and income throughout. These ratings aren’t surprising given that the
first economy refers to Jimmy Carter’s term, while the second refers to Bill Clinton’s first term.
Across all the economies we considered, people consistently base their evaluations on the year 4 economy. After
conducting more than two dozen such studies and examining several explanations, we ultimately conclude that
the election-year focus arises in large part because of the way the news media and the government report
economic statistics. Economic coverage generally reports on recent economic news, especially recent trends in
unemployment and income growth. Since voters fail to receive the information they desire—total growth over the
president’s term—they substitute recent growth in its place without realizing it. If the president’s term ended with
strong growth, voters conclude that it went well overall even if it didn’t. If the president’s term ended with weak
growth, they conclude that it went poorly overall even if total growth was actually strong.
Voter behavior appears to reflect a
pervasive human tendency to
inadvertently substitute an easily
available attribute for an unavailable
one, a tendency that Daniel
Kahneman calls “attribute
substitution.” Studies by Kahneman
and many others have documented
this tendency across a wide array of
experiences, from undergoing
colonoscopies to watching TV ads.
For example, adding an additional
period of mild pain at the end of the
colonoscopy can actually make
patients recall that unpleasant
experience as having been less
painful. As with economic voting,
people judge these experiences not
on the whole, but on how they ended.
This explanation suggests a remedy, a way to align voters’ actions with their intentions. In our experiments,
providing voters with the attribute they are seeking—total economic growth under the president—eliminates their
election-year emphasis. When we provide respondents with total growth, they easily see that strong growth in the
first, second, or third year means that presidents can still preside over strong overall growth even if growth is
weaker in the election year.
The implications for government and the news media are straightforward. Report not just yearly income growth,
but also total growth over a president’s term. It’s what voters say they want to know to evaluate presidential
performance. By making that information easily accessible to voters, the government and the news media could
help end our game of musical chairs with our highest office.
This article is based on the paper “Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the
Election Year Economy” which was published in the American Journal of Political Science
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